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Consequences on Greek owned fleet by the E.U. Phase 
Out Plan (Regulation 1726/2003)
Abstract
Recent nautical accidents (Erika and Prestige), have made the European Union to hasten the adop-
tion of rigid measures where retirement of vessels not included in double side / double hull category 
is concerned. Shipowners operating single hull vessels, objected to such a prospect, but recently, 
the European Union unilaterally decided to hasten the retirement of single hull vessels, producing 
concern in the market.
Greek shipowners represent a major part of the tanker market, owning a large number of single hull 
tankers, thus reacting to the decision of the E.U. by making relative representations towards the In-
ternational Maritime Organisation.
In this paper, consequences towards the Greek owned fleet are examined in relation to the amend-
ment of E.U. Regulation 417/2002 and the implementation of Regulation 1726/2003 from October 
of 2003.
These consequences are expected to have severe effects not only against the competitiveness of Greek 
owned fleet but against the total level of world capacity offered.
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1. The Greek owned fleet
The Greek owned tanker fleet1 – in accordance with Lloyd’s / Fairplays data– on 
December 2002 was consisted of 807 vessels, of total capacity 59.059.756 dwt. If 
upon this number of ships, the 2003 deliveries are added, the Greek owned fleet will 
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1 In the Tanker term the following specialized vessel types are included, in accordance with Lloyd’s / 
Fairplays: Asphalt Tanker, Bitumen Tanker, Bunker Tanker, Chemical Tanker, Chemical/Oil Tanker, 
Crude Oil Tanker, Parcels Tanker, Products Tanker, Replenishment Tanker, Storage Tanker, Tanker, 
and Water Tanker.
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number 867 tankers, of 64.197.494 total dwt capacity (not counting scrapings for the 
year 2003). In detail, in the following table depicts the age allocation of the fleet, the 
number, total dwt capacity and average size per construction annum.
According to article 4 of European Council Regulation 417/2002, no tanker will be 
allowed to operate under any member flag state and furthermore no tanker disregarding 
flag state will be allowed to enter ports or deep sea terminals under the jurisdiction of 
a member state, if the deadline laid down, in accordance to vessel delivery date, has 
expired unless the tanker is considered double hull.
According to the same regulation, tankers are split into three categories, with 
varying retirement dates for each.
In specific, the first category includes pre-MARPOL tankers (not equipped 
with segregated ballast tanks- SBT), the second category includes MARPOL tankers 
(equipped with SBT), and last but not least the third category includes small tankers 
(5-20.000 dwt crude tankers and 5-30.000 dwt tankers).
Table 1: Age Allocation of the Greek Owned Tanker Fleet 
Yrs No DWT A.S. 
1943-1973 150 745.476 4.970 
1974 15 861.211 57.414 
1975 31 1.614.197 52.071 
1976 38 3.277.166 86.240 
1977 24 3.378.725 140.780 
1978 24 1.395.365 58.140 
1979 28 1.594.898 56.961 
1980 51 3.045.783 59.721 
1981 49 2.815.738 57.464 
1982 34 1.700.812 50.024 
1983 28 1.451.067 51.824 
1984 21 984.063 46.860 
1985 11 327.077 29.734 
1986 17 1.566.060 92.121 
1987 15 1.024.523 68.302 
1988 14 1.225.771 87.555 
1989 20 2.426.985 121.349 
1990 11 845.672 76.879 
1991 12 1.439.486 119.957 
1992 13 1.753.904 134.916 
 
Yrs No DWT A.S. 
1993 15 1.646.665 109.778 
1994 8 395.600 49.450 
1995 9 1.444.943 160.549 
1996 15 1.470.362 98.024 
1997 8 608.434 76.054 
1998 23 3.053.769 132.773 
1999 21 2.451.741 116.750 
2000 16 2.579.413 161.213 
2001 20 3.365.530 168.277 
2002 66 8.569.370 129.839 
2003 60 5.137.738 85.629 
 867 64.197.494 74.046 
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Source: Data (original Lloyd’s / Fairplays) as processed by the author
2. European Union and IMO
The International Maritime Organization – IMO on the sitting of the Marine En-
vironment Protection Committee MEPC the proposal that demanded no changes upon 
retirement deadlines schedule on Marpol vessels from Marpol against EU requests was 
adopted, therefore allowing as maximum allowed time-limit the year 2015 as required 
by the “ERIKA” measures and not 2010 according to the “Prestige” packet.
The condition for expanding the life span of a single hull vessel beyond 2010 
would be for her to pass the applicable control expansion of the Condition Assessment 
Scheme-CAS.
Also, should a single hull vessel reach the 20th or 23rd or 25th year of age before 
2015 then it will be retired.
The final decisions for the exact determination of vessel retirement age and if it 
will be implemented by 2015 will be made next December upon the meeting of the 
Marine Environment Protection Committee.
E.U. puts pressure on IMO in order to have the equivocal proposition accepted 
by the Marine Environment Protection Committee. In specific, E.U. representatives 
suggested that should the proposition for retirement on 2015 be accepted, it should 
also result into the addition of a paragraph in MARPOL that would give the right to 
all countries to deny unilaterally entrance to its ports for single hull vessels after the 
year 2010.
The majority of IMO voted down the E.U. proposal, on the terms that on one 
Yrs No DWT A.S. 
1943-1973 150 745.476 4.970 
1974 15 861.211 57.414 
1975 31 1.614.197 52.071 
1976 38 3.277.166 86.240 
1977 24 3.378.725 140.780 
1978 24 1.395.365 58.140 
1979 28 1.594.898 56.961 
1980 51 3.045.783 59.721 
1981 49 2.815.738 57.464 
1982 34 1.700.812 50.024 
1983 28 1.451.067 51.824 
1984 21 984.063 46.860 
1985 11 327.077 29.734 
1986 17 1.566.060 92.121 
1987 15 1.024.523 68.302 
1988 14 1.225.771 87.555 
1989 20 2.426.985 121.349 
1990 11 845.672 76.879 
1991 12 1.439.486 119.957 
1992 13 1.753.904 134.916 
 
Yrs No DWT A.S. 
1993 15 1.646.665 109.778 
1994 8 395.600 49.450 
1995 9 1.444.943 160.549 
1996 15 1.470.362 98.024 
1997 8 608.434 76.054 
1998 23 3.053.769 132.773 
1999 21 2.451.741 116.750 
2000 16 2.579.413 161.213 
2001 20 3.365.530 168.277 
2002 66 8.569.370 129.839 
2003 60 5.137.738 85.629 
 867 64.197.494 74.046 
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hand it is of no necessity and on the other hand it is against the IMO spirit resulting in 
the statutory debasement and subsequent abolition of the role of IMO since everyone 
will be doing as he pleases.
However, with the implementation of the regulation by October E.U. sends a 
sound message to IMO.
The legal issue at hand however remains what to be done till the E.U. “Prestige” 
packet of measures comes into world implementation in mid 2005. Because if it is to 
be valid worldwide, whatever decision is made on December the Marpol convention 
will have to be amended. Whereas amendments as stated in the treaty itself come 
into effect after an 18th month period. Thus in a world level the “prestige” packet of 
measures will be implemented by mid 2005 whatever its variation maybe.
3. Basic Points of the amendment of the Regulation
The basic points of the amendment of the regulation can be pinpointed mainly on 
the dates of retirement for the three categories of tankers ranging from 2 years (Category 
I), to five years (Categories II and III). The banning of Oil related product carriage 
by single hull vessels is further expanded on mooring points under the jurisdiction of 
member - states.
Furthermore, the implementation field of the Regulation is being amended so that 
tankers of 600 dwt and more are addressed ensuring that the ban on heavy crude oil 
distillates carriage by single hull vessels will also be implemented on small tankers, 
of the range of 600 to 5000 dwt.
In addition, a wider implementation of the status of Condition Assessment 
Schemes, aiming at the evaluation of the structural validity of single hull tankers that 
have exceeded the 15th year of age.
It is noted that the most important amendment is the one regarding the hastening 
of retirement and of course the banning of heavy crude oil distillates carriage on the 
range of 600 to 5000 dwt tankers.
For the above reason, our research is expanded into three situations: the one in 
effect based on Regulation 417/2002, the amendment of the Regulation but without 
the small tanker banning (600 – 5.000 dwt), and last but not least the amendment of 
the Regulation including the banning of carriage of heavy crude oil distillates by small 
tankers.
4. Research Concessions
For the calculation of the effects of the amendment of the Regulation on the 
Greek owned tanker fleet, we have acknowledged that all tankers of Category I (pre-
MARPOL) will not be affected, since the few that still trade can easily and with a 
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relatively low cost be converted to Category II tankers (MARPOL SBT configuration), 
till 2007, which is the last date of retirement.
For the tanker Categories II and III, the dates provided by the Regulation, are in 
every way the same and therefore it was the authors consideration that the whole of 
the Greek owned tanker fleet will adhere to the timetable of Category II.
According to that timetable, the retirement of tankers starts by 2003 for vessels 
delivered till 1973 and ends by 2015 for vessels delivered on 1989 or later and have 
no double hull.
In the tankers to be retired all single hull vessels were calculated along with vessel 
types that possess double bottom but no double hull. And finally, on the “compatible” 
types (and as a result not affected by Regulation 417) of tankers apart from the double 
hull tankers, double side tankers were also calculated.
5. The Results of the Research
Research results show that the effect volume on Greek owned fleet by the amend-
ment of 417/2002 Regulation in terms of numbers and for ships exceededing 5.000 dwt, 
the amendment will result into the retirement of a further 37 vessels and the retirement 
hastening of 108 in all vessels.
Diagram 1
Source: Data Processed by the authors
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Diagram 2
Source: Data Processing by the authors 
In terms of dwt, amendment effects are depicted on diagram 2. The quality vari-
ance that stems from the two different retirement schemes, has to do mainly with the 
‘’premature technical redundancy’’ of a major part of the fleet since on the year 2010, 
among others vessels of less or about 15 years of age are being retired.
An likewise important finding of the research is regarding the hastening of replace-
ment of a further 8 million dwt on the time frame of the seven years to come. This fact, is 
expected to further fuel the development of Asian shipyards (Japan, S. Korea, China), 
in expanse of European yards that are already short on competitiveness.
On the other hand, questions are made on the obtainability of the modification 
scheme, due to the fact that already by 2010 a serious issue of shortage of offered ca-
pacity is expected with unknown consequences to tanker charter markets (Table 2).
Table 2 (Vessels of 5.000 dwt and above)
 
 Regulation 417/2002 E.C Regulation 417/2002 E.C 
2003 32 (11) 479.037 69 2.876.113 
2004 37 2.397.076 32 3.264.060 
2005 55 6.632.723 23 3.368.663 
2006 43 2.964.400 43 2.964.400 
2007 88 5.501.778 88 5.501.778 
 
 Regulation 417/2002 E.C Regulati n 417/2002 E.C 
2008 30 1.621.690 30 1.621.690 
2009 23 1.202.890 23 1.202.890 
2010 15 740.687 87 8.796.660 
2011 9 197.367   
2012 13 1.374.587   
2013 10 716.020   
2014 6 561.340   
2015 34 5.206.659   
 363 29.596.254 395 29.596.254 
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The effects of research acquire a rather gloomy aspect where tanker owners are 
concerned if the banning of carriage of heavy crude oil distillates comes into effect for 
the so named small tankers (600 – 5.000 dwt).
As depicted on diagrams 3 and 4 the Regulation amendment hastens the retire-
ment of 162 additional tankers from which the majority concerns small tankers of high 
contribution to oil trade by sea on behalf of the countries of the European Union.
In terms of dwt, in the year 2010, 29,5% of the total capacity to be retired is being 
retired (8,8 mil. dwt), creating a chaos on oil charter markets and endangering intra 
community trade of oil goods. (Table 3).
Table 3 (Phase Out of tankers ranging 600 dwt and more)
 
 Regulation 417/2002 E.C Regulation 417/2002 E.C 
2003 32 (11) 479.037 69 2.876.113 
2004 37 2.397.076 32 3.264.060 
2005 55 6.632.723 23 3.368.663 
2006 43 2.964.400 43 2.964.400 
2007 88 5.501.778 88 5.501.778 
 
 Regulation 417/2002 E.C Regulation 417/2002 E.C 
2008 30 1.621.690 30 1.621.690 
2009 23 1.202.890 23 1.202.890 
2010 15 740.687 87 8.796.660 
2011 9 197.367   
2012 13 1.374.587   
2013 10 716.020   
2014 6 561.340   
2015 34 5.206.659   
 363 29.596.254 395 29.596.254 
 
 
 Regulation 417/2002 E.C Regulation 1726/2003 E.C 
2003 32 479.037 192 3.156.292 
2004 37 2.397.076 38 3.277.116 
2005 55 6.632.723 27 3.378.725 
2006 43 2.964.400 52 2.990.263 
2007 88 5.501.778 94 5.514.409 
2008 30 1.621.690 32 1.626.785 
2009 23 1.202.890 24 1.204.743 
2010 15 740.687 98 8.832.338 
2011 9 197.367   
2012 13 1.374.587   
2013 10 716.020   
2014 6 561.340   
2015 34 5.206.659   
 395 29.596.254 557 29.980.671 
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Diagram 3
Source: Data processing by the authors
Diagram 4
Source: Data Processing by the authors
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Conclusions
This research has concluded in a most apparent fashion the dire consequences the 
amendment of Regulation 417/2002 has on the Greek – owned tanker fleet, especially 
should these measures expand to the category of vessels with trade capacity of 600 
dwt and more (instead of the existing 5.000 dwt and more).
Proof of the fact that the above mentioned amendment was based on the logic of 
appeasing the general public and not on any results of scientific analysis is the imbalance 
that will be evident in the tanker market, which is expected to harm community traders 
and intracommunity traders of oil goods – of which their majority is seaborne.
Noteworthy is the fact that under certain conditions our country could benefit from 
a gradual – and not hastened – tanker retirement for the trade capacity category of 600 
dwt till 6.000 dwt. Indeed a combination of motives and flexible strategy could have 
yielded the Greek yards a hefty part of the orders, a fact that till this day seems rather 
difficult if not impossible. Something like that could aid both the Greek shipbuilding 
yards and the Perama shipbuilding and shiprepair zone.
Finally, whatever the case maybe the above mentioned dire consequences can 
be cushioned since the opposition of many a shipping countries is expected within 
the frames of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), that will have to either 
validate or rejection of the E.U proposed amendment of Regulation 417/2002 by the 
early December of 2003.
In the level of international organizations, IMO was based on the last Clarkson 
report – that acts as consultant to the IMO concerning the “Prestigev” packet of mea-
sures effects – that was designed after a notion by the Greek shipping Co-operation 
Committee.
In detail the nine-page report on consequences regarding the possible implementa-
tion of the E.U. proposal for the hastening of retirement comes into three conclusions:
1. Based on the current E.U. proposal for the “Prestige” measures, 74% of the 
tankers will have to retire within two years. The most severe consequence will come at 
2010 which is the final date for retirement of all single hull tankers from E.U. waters, 
when tankers of total capacity of 65,5 million dwt will be retired.
From the moment these vessels will be sent to scrapping facilities, on a far younger 
age than usual, it is highly unlikely that any vessel will be sold for scrap before the 
limiting dates of the time schedule. Thus everyone will make an effort to focalize on 
the last possible retirement date of 2010.
An characteristic sign of the “congestion” that will take place on the whole 
scrapping sector is the statistical element that the greatest capacity ever to have been 
recorded scrapped was in 1985 25,5 million dwt, which is by 40 million dwt less than 
what is expected for 2010.
2. This high concentration on 2010 will lead into “inflexibility” of the market. A 
result of the fact that the flexibility of the time when a ship is to be retired is crucial 
to the tanker market.
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Oil trade remains an activity flexible, dependent on supply and demand of vessels. 
The concentrated retirement of vessels on 2010 will create high risks for a prolonged 
period of tanker shortage or oversupply.
3. On 2010 a total of 247 tankers, of 39 million dwt capacity will be retired with 
an age of less than 20 years with direct consequences to the finances of shipping com-
panies and loan supplying banks.
Where banks that granted loans on companies investing on acquiring single hull 
tankers are concerned, they will have to reconsider therir position since single hull 
tankers are already losing their value as their operational and profiting years are being 
reduced.
Shipowners on the other hand also watch their capitals shrink as their single hull 
tankers lose value. There are already signs of an impending downfall of monohull 
prices at the prospect of an adoption of E.U. measures.
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Utjecaj Plana EU o postupnom povlačenju brodova na 
grčku flotu
Sažetak
Nedavne pomorske nezgode (Erica i Prestige) potakle su EU da ubrza donošenje oštrijih mjera u svezi 
s povlačenjem iz plovidbe brodova bez dvostruke oplate.
Brodari se tome planu protive, ali nedavno je EU jednostrano odlučila ubrzati povlačenje brodova s 
jednostrukom oplatom iz plovidbe, što je izazvalo zabrinutost na tržištu.
Grčki brodovlasnici predstavljaju većinu na tržištu brodova cisterni kao vlasnici velikoga broja brodova 
s jednostrukom oplatom te stoga na odluku EU odgovaraju upućivanjem odgovarajućih predstavki 
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Međunarodnoj organizaciji rada.
U ovome se radu ispituju posljedice izmjene Propisa EU broj 417/2002 te primjene Propisa EU 
broj1726/2003 od listopada 2003. na grčku flotu.
Očekuje se da će te posljedice ozbiljno ugroziti ne samo konkurentnost grčke flote, već i ukupnih 
kapaciteta koji se nude na svjetskome tržištu.
Ključne riječi: pomorska nezgoda, povlačenje broda iz plovidbe, dvostruka oplata, jednostruka 
oplata
Ripercussioni sulla flotta greca a causa del programma 
di ritiro graduale delle navi-cisterna previsto 
dall’Unione europea (Regolamento 1726/2003)
Sommario
Alcuni recenti sinistri marittimi (Erika e Prestige) hanno indotto l’Unione europea ad accelerare 
l’adozione di misure più severe riguardo il ritiro delle navi che non rientrano nella categoria delle 
navi a doppio scafo.
Gli armatori di navi a scafo semplice hanno sollevato forti obiezioni a questa prospettiva. Tuttavia di 
recente l’Unione europea ha deciso con mossa unilaterale di sollecitare il ritiro di dette navi creando 
notevole preoccupazione nel settore.
Gli armatori greci che partecipano in maggioranza al mercato delle navi-cisterna con un gran numero 
di navi a scafo semplice hanno reagito alla decisione dell’Unione europea presentando ricorso presso 
l’Organizzazione marittima internazionale.
Nel saggio si esaminano le ripercussioni sulla flotta greca in relazione all’emendamento dell’U.E. 
Regolamento 417/2002 e l’applicazione del Regolamento 1726/2003 dall’ottobre del 2003. Si pre-
vedeno gravi conseguenze non solo sulla capacità concorrenziale della flotta greca, ma ripercussioni 
a livello mondiale.
Parole chiave: sinistro marittimo, ritiro della nave, scafo soppio, scafo semplice

